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Abstract 
Secure communication mechanisms in Wireless Sensor 
Networks (WSNs) have been widely deployed to ensure 
confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of the nodes and data.  
Recently many WSNs applications rely on trusted 
communication to ensure large user acceptance. Indeed, the 
trusted relationship thus far can only be achieved through Trust 
Management System (TMS) or by adding external security chip 
on the WSN platform. In this study an alternative mechanism is 
proposed to accomplish trusted communication between sensors 
based on the principles defined by Trusted Computing Group 
(TCG). The results of other related study have also been analyzed 
to validate and support our findings. Finally the proposed trusted 
mechanism is evaluated for the potential application on resource 
constraint devices by quantifying their power consumption on 
selected major processes. The result proved the proposed scheme 
can establish trust in WSN with less computation and 
communication and most importantly eliminating the need for 
neighboring evaluation for TMS or relying on external security 
chip.  
Keywords: Trusted, Security, Authentication, Wireless Sensor 
Network, Identity-based cryptography 
1. Introduction 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) is network consisting 
of sensor nodes or motes communicating wirelessly with 
each other. Advancement in sensor, low power processor, 
and wireless communication technology has greatly 
contributed to the tremendous wide spread use of WSNs 
applications in contemporary living. Example of these 
applications include environmental monitoring, disaster 
handling, traffic control and various ubiquitous 
convergence applications and services[1]. Low cost and 
without the need of cabling are two key motivations 
towards future WSN applications. These applications 
however demand for considerations on security issues 
especially those regarding nodes authentications, data 
integrity and confidentiality. Commonly, the sensor nodes 
are left unattended, and are vulnerable to intruders. The 
situation becomes critical when the nodes are equipped 
with cryptographic materials such as keys and other 
important data in the sensor nodes. Moreover, adversaries 
can introduce fake nodes similar to the nodes available in 
the network which further leave the sensor nodes as un-
trusted entities.  Two approaches have been widely 
researched to ensure the validity of nodes in the networks 
thus further confirm the need of trusted communication 
between nodes in the network. The following paragraph 
briefly discusses the two approaches.  
 
TMS is one of the more widely used mechanisms in aiding 
WSN member (trustors) in dealing with the uncertainties in 
participants (trustees) future actions  [2]. It basically 
studies the behaviour of the nodes in the networks for a 
certain period and calculates the trust value. However, 
TMS can only detect the existence of fake nodes in the 
network after a certain period. Hence, adversary nodes 
may have participated in the network and may have caused 
network disorders by the time TMS identifies them. 
Furthermore, since TMS is mathematical-based it 
indirectly imposes burdens to sensor nodes such as extra 
processing power, memory requirement, and 
communication in the networks.  
 
The node’s trustworthiness can also be achieved through 
the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) crypto-processor 
chip. In a recent work, Wen Hu [3, 4] used the TPM 
hardware which is based on Public Key (PK) platform to 
augment the security of the sensor nodes.  It was claimed 
that the SecFleck architecture proposed in [3] provides the 
internet-level PK services with reasonable energy 
consumption and financial overhead. Unfortunately, the 
drawbacks of TPM chip which include extra hardware 
entailed on the platform and the superfluous of commands 
required to perform its functions both contribute to higher 
energy utilizations. 
 
To avoid the  infeasibility of deploying TPM chip in 
wireless sensor nodes, this study proposes the use of the 
ARM1176JZF-S processor with Trustzone features as 
described in [5].  
  
This paper proposes a secure mechanism to accomplish a 
trusted relationship between sensors in the wireless 
networks according to TCG specifications. Firstly it 
describes how the trusted platform is established; follows 
by the description on trusted authentication protocol that 
confirms only trusted nodes existed in the network.  Finally 
it presents an analysis on the energy consumption for the 
trusted platform and the authentication protocol.  
 
The remainder of this paper is structured into six major 
parts:  Section 2 addresses the current security challenges 
in WSNs followed with some introductory notes on trust as 
outlined by TCG and Identity Based Encryption (IBE) in 
section 3 and 4 respectively.  Section 5 introduces the 
design for a trusted platform based on ARM1176JZF-S 
processor. Further, Section 5 describes the proposed IBE-
Trust security framework.  Then the analysis on the 
proposed scheme is discussed in Section 6. Finally, Section 
7 concludes the paper.  
2. Security in WSNs 
Security mechanisms for WSNs can be divided into three 
related phases. The first phase is to secure the sensor node 
or the platform itself so that the network originator can 
guarantee the integrity of the sensor node of the network. 
Next phase is the big challenge in securing the network 
infrastructure or the wireless medium to ensure reliable, 
secure and trusted communication. The final phase 
involves protecting the confidentiality and integrity of the 
data since in wireless communication anyone can intercept 
the data. Hence these three components namely the sensor 
node, network infrastructure and data are the crucial 
entities that need to be protected in wireless sensor 
network. This served as the fundamental requirement in the 
design of a trusted wireless sensor framework. The 
following sub-sections present the proposed security goals 
and the simplified TCG specifications adopted as the basis 
in the design of secured framework.  
2.1 Proposed Security Goals 
In acknowledging the various types of attacks in WSNs as 
discussed in [6],  the secured framework in this study 
proposes the following security features.  
 
Trusted Platform - Trusted Platform is achieved through a 
chain-of-trust with image identified as “bootloader1” in the 
SoC ROM as the Root of Trust (ROT) and a secure boot 
process that measures the integrity of software images, 
applications, and components on the sensor nodes. Also, 
the trusted platform offers secure memory location for 
sensitive credentials such as private keys.  
Trusted Authentication - Verifies that a sender is a trusted 
user or node and will behave in a trusted manner for the 
network. The authentication protocol which is developed 
on Identity based Cryptography is identified as IBE_Trust.  
This protocol confirms the authenticity of nodes and also 
the confidentiality and integrity of the exchanged message. 
2.2 TCG Specifications for Trust Establishment 
According to [7], trust can be defined as an entity that 
always behaves in  an expected way for any intended 
functions. The basic properties of a trusted computer or 
system can be listed as follows; 
 
• Isolation of programs – prevents program A from 
accessing data of program B 
• Clear separation between user and supervisor 
process – there should be a system to prevent user 
applications from being interfered by the operating 
system. 
• Long term protected storage – secret values are 
stored in a place that last across power cycles and 
other events. 
• Identification of current configuration – provides 
identity of the platform as well as software or 
hardware executing on it. 
• Verifiable report of the platform identity and 
current configuration – a way for other users to 
validate a platform. 
• Include Hardware based protection- protection in a 
combination of hardware and software. 
 
The basic building block of a trusted platform according to 
TCG definition consists of properties, measurement and 
reporting. Properties refer to unique or unaltered values 
over the life of the platform. Measurement is the process of 
obtaining the identity of the platform function and should 
begin at the ROT of the platform. It will measure the hash 
value of the platform component before passing the control 
to the next process. The flow of the measurement process 
is called the ‘Chain – of –Trust’. The ROT is an entity that 
must be trusted as well as properly protected as there is no 
mechanism available to measure it.  Finally, the reporting 
will provide the evidence to those wishing to rely on the 
information and is established through report or attestation. 
 
Note that trust is established through two different 
processes which are measurement and reporting or 
attestation. In order to ensure message integrity and 
confidentiality during the reporting process, the message 
will be encrypted using Identity Based Encryption (IBE) 
algorithm. Brief discussion on IBE is presented in the 
subsequent section.    
  
3. Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) 
IBE was proposed by Adi Shamir in 1984 and only in 
2001, Boneh and Franklin [8] have successfully 
implemented a fully functioning IBE scheme. The IBE has 
simplified the certificate based public key encryption 
scheme by using publicly known unique identifiers to 
derive public keys and eliminate the needs of certificate 
authority.     
 
 
In IBE, an arbitrary string is used as a public key. The 
public key can be calculated from any string such as email, 
project name or any other string.  According to RFC 5408 
[9], an IBE public key can be calculated by anyone who 
has the essential public key while a cryptographic secret 
(master key) is needed to calculate the IBE private key, in 
which the calculation can only be performed by a trusted 
server that has this secret. In WSN, the trusted authority or 
trusted entities is the BS which has to be placed in the most 
secured place and controlled directly by the network 
proprietor. Besides that, the existence of pre-deployment 
stage offers better security and controlled environment for 
the key distribution phase. This criterion does not exist in 
other Public Key Cryptography (PKC) infrastructure.  
 
Another characteristic that differentiates IBE from other 
server-based cryptography is that no communication is 
required with the server during encryption operation 
whereby the sender only needs to know the recipient’s ID 
to encrypt the message. Additionally, IBE implementation 
also consumes less memory for storing public keys of the 
other nodes. These factors have supported the use of IBC 
instead of PKC in this implementation.  Fig. 1 portrays the 
difference in concept between PKC and IBC followed by 
four stages in standard IBC implementation. 
 
 
Fig. 1 IBC and PKC standard implementation 
 
Setup – This process should be done by any Trusted Agent 
(TA). In WSNs, TA can be the BS. A security parameter k 
is provided as the input and BS will generates the public 
BF parameters (G1, GT, ê, n, P, sP, H1, H2, H3, H4) and its 
master key, s. The parameters are pre-loaded to all sensor 
nodes in the network. Interested readers can refer to the 
book by Luther Martin [10] for more details. 
 
Extract- The extract process needs public parameters and 
master key values from the setup process. The public keys 
associated with sensor node ID are identified by mapping 
the identity on the elliptic curve E/Fq: y2 = x3 + 1 using Eq. 
(1).  The outcome from the cryptographic hash function 
QIDx is then multiplied with the master key, s to obtain the 
private key dx.  
QIDx=H1(IDx)   (1) 
dx=sQIDx     (2) 
 
Encrypt – The input to this process includes common 
parameters, recipient ID and message M ∈M and the 
output ciphertext C∈C. 
C = encrypt(params,ID,M)   (3) 
 
Decrypt – The input to this process are common 
parameters, private key dx, and C∈C  while the output is 
M ∈M.  
M=decrypt(params,dx,C)   (4) 
 
4. Framework of Trusted Sensor Node 
This section discusses the methods used to accomplish the 
previously mentioned security features. It is divided into 
two major sections which are identified as Trusted 
Platform and IBE-Trust for simplicity.  
4.1 Trusted Platform  
The security provided by cryptography mainly depends on 
safeguarding the cryptographic keys from adversaries. It 
grants the need to adequately protect the keys to ensure 
confidentiality and integrity of sensitive data. This section 
discusses on how this study manipulates ARM1176JZF-S 
security features to fulfil the TCG trust definition for a 
trusted platform. Listed are ARM1176JZF-S features that 
are used to realize the basic properties of trusted platform 
design.  Fig. 2 correlates TCG trust specifications with the 
proposed solution.  
 
Secure world – sensitive resources such as encryption and 
decryption images will be placed in the secured world 
memory locations. Trust Zone Address space controller 
  
(TZASC) is used to configure regions as either secure or 
non-secure.  All non-secure processes will be rejected from 
the secure region. This ensures the confidentiality of 
important data and images.   
 
Single physical core – safe and efficient execution of code 
from both normal and secure world. Secure monitor codes 
are developed to switch from normal to secure and vice 
versa. 
 
On-SoC RAM and ROM - will ensure no highly sensitive 
data leaves the chip thus reduce the possibility of physical 
attacks. 
 
Secure boot – a process to ensure the integrity of the 
software images and devices on the platform and generate 
management value as platform unique entity.  
 
IBE-Trust protocol – confirming secure communication 
between sensors and BS. 
 
Fig. 2 Process flow of the framework 
 
Fig. 3 Correlation between TCG specification and our proposed solution 
4.2 Secure Boot Process as the Chain-Of-Trust 
The overall process was developed based on 
ARM1176JZF-S development board. Codes are written in 
assembly language to minimize memory size and to speed 
up processing time. At the point of writting, this study has 
successfully developed a secure boot process up to Level 2 
(L2) of a total of three levels. The proposed Chain-of-Trust 
is best described as follows: 
 
Level 1 (L1): The  ROT which is the entity that must be 
trusted is located in the 16KB on-SoC ROM of the 
ARM1176JZF-S processor. The integrity (I0) of the image 
that is burned into it which is the 1st Boot loader image is 
assumed to be unmodifiable and therefore is always 
TRUE. This assigns 1 to level 1 (L1)  
 
ROT  Boot Loader (BL1)[assume trust]  Integrity (I1) 
= True= 1  
 ∴ L1 = 1 
 
Level 2 (L2): Verifies image of the second bootloader 
(BL2) residing in the external storage by measuring the 
hash value of the image. The referenced value is 
predetermined and is stored together with the first level 
bootloader. If the integrity of 2nd bootloader (I2) is verified, 
then the 2nd bootloader image is loaded and executed. 
 
Hash (BL2)’ == Hash value of [(BL2) in BL1]  Integrity 
(I2) = True = 1 
 ∴ L2 = 1 
 
Where the prime symbol “ ’ ” substitutes as the new 
measure values. 
At this stage, if I2 equals to 0, the process will halt. The 
sensor node will be able to complete the secure boot 
process only if the integrity in each level is true. Once 
successful, the unique value generated from the secured 
boot process will then be used to establish the trust 
relationship with the BS. Due to the limited register space 
in ARM1176JZF-S, the secured boot design will only 
consider eight hexadecimal characters as the comparison 
value. For validation, hundreds of different images were 
hashed using SHA-2 algorithm and it was found that none 
of the output produced an identical eight hash value in a 
location. For security reason, the location is undisclosed. 
The secure boot integrity (I) is checked using the Boolean 
equation as in Eq. (5). 
 
I = I1.I2.I3......IN-1.IN  (5) 
 
Where, N represents the level in the secured boot process 
or the last entity in the chain of trust. The integrity 
checking is transitive from 1 to 2 to 3 and to N and does 
not invert where trusting entity 1 does not imply to trusting 
entity N and trusting entity N requires trusting entity 1 to 
N-1.    
  
4.3 SHA-256 
SHA is a type of cryptographic hash function that 
guarantees the integrity. As the security-performance 
tradeoff is relatively linear, two factors are identified 
contributing to the selection of the hash algorithm.  First is 
the size of the algorithm itself; it must be small enough to 
fit into the secured location and the second is that the 
algorithm must be powerful enough to resist from attacks 
with no collision [11] in the algorithm. This study takes 
advantages of the 256-bit SHA-2 as the hash algorithm. 
Although there are several algorithms in the SHA family, 
SHA-2 has proven to be safe  in literatures to date [12]. 
SHA-2 output 64 hexadecimal characters or 256-bit hash 
values and is considered as “sufficiently high” for the 
foreseeable future. Moreover the run time necessary for a 
birthday attack is on the order of 2128 and therefore is 
currently assumed to be collision free.    
4.4 Secure and Non-secure world 
Trustzone architecture of the ARM processor enables the 
construction of a programmable environment that allows 
the confidentiality and integrity of almost any asset to be 
protected from specific attacks. In other words, there are 
two different modes in ARM processor. Normal mode 
allows access to all system resources while secure mode 
restricts access to resources. Trustzone state is controlled 
by the Secure Monitor Code (SMC) that handles switching 
between secured and non-secured world. SMC requires 
complex codes to allow calls from complex Real Time 
Operating System (RTOS). Other method is by specifying 
the secured and non-secured region in the scatter file. 
Sensitive processes such as SHA-2, encryption and 
decryption were configured to run in a secured 
environment by calling the monitor switch function prior to 
process. This is straight forward and sufficient for 
currently proposed system.  
4.5 Address Space Partitioning and Interrupts 
Trustzone address spaces are divided into secure (only 
accessible in trust world) and non-secure regions 
(accessible from both state). TrustZone Protection 
Controller (TZPC) is one of the ways used to configure 
different regions in the memory as secured or non-secured. 
However, this work defines secured and non-secure 
regions using page-table file because it was found much 
simpler and less complex. The world in which the 
processor is executed is indicated by the non-secure bit 
(NS-bit) in the secured configuration register (CP15). Low 
value of NS-bit indicates the secured world execution. IRQ 
and FIQ are two interrupt vectors that are used to switch 
the processor into monitor mode.  
 
The abovementioned sections have discussed the methods 
to accomplish the first two basic building block of 
becoming a trusted platform which are property and 
measurement. Following sections discuss on 
communication procedures in registering valid sensor 
nodes into the network utilizing the unique entity derived 
earlier, thus fulfill the third specification which is reporting 
through attestation or report. 
5. IBE-Trust Security Model 
 Typical WSNs scenarios adopted in the proposed 
framework are uncontrolled environment, random node 
placement and self configuration.  The networks consist of 
several sensor nodes and a BS as the trusted agent. All 
sensor nodes communicate via bi-directional wireless link 
with equal transmission range. Each node has a unique, 
string based, non-zero identity and are loosely 
synchronized. During the first implementation, all sensors 
in the network will report its ID to BS.  
 
Standard four IBE stages have been reduced to three stages 
in the implementation. The earlier two stages which are 
setup and extract are combined together. The combination 
of the two stages was made possible due to the proposed 
IBE implementation procedure. The overall development 
used the Tate Pairing algorithm by [13] downloaded from 
Shamus website [14]. The MIRACL library was than 
compiled into ARM single image library and was included 
in the executable images (ibe_gen, encrypt, and decrypt) to 
benchmark elliptic curve point manipulation.   
 
For implementation, this study suggests four different 
stages starting from generation of keys and common 
parameters to on-line node registration. Scopes of the 
different stages are discussed in the following subsections.  
5.1 Delivery phase (DP) 
 
The DP stage is offline with the intention to provide the 
networks with complete information such as the identity of 
sensor nodes, private keys, master key, and BF parameters 
except master key. All newly joined nodes need to go 
through this stage thus allowing the BS to have a list of 
nodes appear in the network.  
5.2 Pre-Deployment (PDP) 
 
Once configured with the necessary information, the sensor 
nodes will go through a boot-up process under a controlled 
environment to generate its unique management value. The 
  
generated value together with the sensor node ID will 
securely be sent to BS for further verification.  
5.3 Deployment Stage (DY) 
 
This process happens immediately after node deployment 
at the intended location. At this stage the sensor node will 
boot up and go through the secure boot process.  Outcome 
from this stage is the same unique trust value.  
5.4 Trusted Authentication (TA) 
 
This stage aims to register node’s unique ID with BS for 
further communication. Successful boot up node will 
report it trust value to the trusted authority, which in this 
case is the BS. The BS will then decrypt the message, 
verify the unique ID together with the trust value in its 
database. Upon successful authentication, BS will generate 
a new list containing the trusted node’s identity (trustID). 
This new list, which is smaller than the trust list will be 
distributed to sensors in its network for faster verification 
process between nodes. To this stage, this study has not 
finalized any secure distribution methods of trustID table 
to existing nodes in the network.  
5.5 Packet format 
 
According to IEEE 802.15.4 compliant radio transceiver 
standard, the maximum packet length is 127 bytes. 
However, maximum data payload for CC2420 transceiver 
according to TinyOS packet format is 114 bytes. However, 
to enable extra information for IBE_trust protocol, the 
maximum data size or payload is now reduced to 106 
bytes. The IBE_trust packet consists of 2 bytes sender ID, 
2 bytes random nonce value, bytes message and 4 bytes 
truncated MAC. Fig. 4 depicts the packet format starting 
with raw message followed by payload data structure 
according to TinyOS and finally IBE_trust packet format. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Packet Structure 
Trusted nodes in the network remain in trusted condition 
as long as it remains in the ON state. Once rebooted or 
shutdown for any reason, the nodes will need to re-
authenticate with the BS. Failure to authenticate will lead 
to node termination process where the node’s ID will be 
removed from the trust list. Formal analysis of the protocol 
will be discussed in our later publications.  
 
 
Fig. 5 IBE_Trust Authentication protocol 
5.6 ID based-one-pass Authenticated Key Exchange 
(AKE)  
 
Due to availability of trust list in each sensor, subsequent 
communications between sensors are very much 
simplified. Receiving sensor will be authenticated based on 
sender ID and upon successful, receiver will locally 
generate session key using pre-installed key derivation 
function (KDF) based on the receiving value for its 
subsequent secure communication.  To utilize the installed 
parameters, the AKE is based on the symmetric bilinear 
pairings. 
 
A: Picks random number r∈Z*q,  
 
Computes R= rQA where QA is public key of A and send R 
to B over public channel using packet format as depicted 
in Fig. 5.   
 
A  B:  Snd(A.B.IDA.R'.Na'.Mac(IDA.R'.Na'))  
 
where h = H2(R,IDA||IDB) and is computed by both parties 
and SA is the private key of node A which is securely 
stored in On-SoC ROM. Both parties A and B then 
compute the shared secret as KAB = e((r+h)SA,QB) and KBA 
= e(R + hQA,SB) and finally the session key is computed by 
A as κ(KAB) and by B as κ(KBA) where κ is key 
derivation function.  
 
CC2420 raw packet format 
TinyOS packet format 
IBE_Trust packet format 
  
The idea towards this implementation is adopted from ID-
based one-pass AKE technique [15] and the only 
difference is in the authentication value where, [28] 
authenticated using sender public key and this work used 
sender ID.   
 
Suggested applications for the proposed scheme include 
health and medical monitoring where nodes assigned to 
users may first have to register with the BS and once 
successful they are free to move and data can travel 
securely direct to the BS or in multi-hop manner.   
5.7 Energy Equation 
 
To confirm the practicability of the proposed IBE-trust 
scheme in WSNs, this study also calculates the energy 
consumption for a newly joined sensor node. Due to the 
availability of switching process between secured and non-
secured modes in ARM1176JZF-S, the switching energy is 
added to the energy consumption equation for more 
accurate values. The total energy for sending encrypted 
data (unique trust value) to the BS is calculated as in Eq. 
(6). All energy values are presented in joules using Eq. (9).  
 
ET  = EBoot+ESW + Eenc/bit*data(bits) + Eta  (6) 
 
Eta = ETx*bytes transmitted + ERx*bytes received 
 (7) 
 
Substituting (7) into (6), makes (8): 
 
ET = EBoot+ESW + Eenc*data(bits) + ETx*bytes + ERx*bytes 
      
    (8) 
 
E(J) = Power in watts * time  (9) 
 
5.8 Notations 
Table 1 describes the notations used in the proposed 
scheme. 
 
Table 1: Notations used in the proposed scheme 
Symbol Description 
IDA Identifier of sensor node A 
PvKA Private key of sensor node A 
A.S Sender ID.Receiver ID 
Hm_A’ New trust value (DY) stage 
Hm_A Trust value at PDP stage 
Na’,Nb’ Random Nonce 
Ks , KA Public key BS and A 
Snd Send packet 
 _Ks Encrypted packet with KS public key 
Mac Hash function 
M Message 
Sid, Rid Sender ID and Receiver ID 
d(Hm_A) Decrypt(Hm_A) 
ACK Acknowledgement packet 
EBoot Secure boot-up energy 
ESW Energy in Switching process 
ETx , ERx Transmit and Receive energy 
Eenc/bit Encryption energy per bit 
Eta Trusted Authentication energy 
 
6. Analysis of the proposed scheme 
This section presents the analysis of the proposed scheme.  
6.1 Energy Utilization 
The results are obtained by conducting the analysis on the 
ARM1176JZF-S development board. The processor runs 
at 20mA, 3.6V with frequency 667MHz. Since the 
encryption and communication processes consume most of 
the energy[16],  this study only considers the  amount of 
energy used by these processes. As part of the  
benchmarking,  this study also compares the work with 
secFleck [3] implementation that utilizes TPM chip in 
providing the public key technology for WSN.  
 
The energy per bit used in the encryption process for 
secFleck (hardware/software) is 5.4/7030µJ while in this 
study the energy/bit is 22.5 µJ used for the encryption 
process which is fully implemented using software. 
Although the energy used in the proposed scheme is higher 
compared to SecFleck hardware based implementation, it 
does not employ external crypto-processor chip on the 
sensor node platform.  
 
Based on a preliminary testing in this study, the switching 
process takes about 0.23s and consumes around 16.56mJ 
of energy which is higher than that required for the 
encryption process. This limits switching from normal to 
secure mode and vice versa for important processes only. 
However the delay can be reduced in actual 
implementation where function calls to clock and standard 
input-output can be eliminated.  
 
Tate pairing as seen in Table 3 consumed the highest 
energy due to its complicated computation. However,  this 
study obtains 0.148J lower than the result obtained by 
Doyle et al. [17] that utilized ARM7. This shows an 
indirect relationship between the processor specifications 
and sensor node lifetime. Hence, it implicates the use of 
dedicated low power processor for embedded applications.   
To realize computational complexity of trusted 
authentication and authenticated key exchange, energy 
utilization of the above processes is calculated and 
presented. As energy to transmit and receive is 
  
proportional to message size, total energy is calculated 
using equation 6. Assuming 106 bytes payload and 21 
bytes header, nodes performing trusted authentication 
process needs to transmit an encrypted message of 280 
bytes consisting of key file and cipher text message and 
receive an acknowledgement packet with list of trusted 
node ID (one time only during node deployment). 
 
 Assuming 200 nodes, size of trustID will be around 
400bytes and total bytes received are around 480 bytes 
including packet header ((400/106)*127). For nodes to 
nodes authentication and key exchange, node only needs to 
send a single message, sized 85 bytes (64 bytes of rQA and 
21 bytes header) to its neighbor. Table 4 tabulated the 
energy consumption based on CC2420 transceiver used in 
the proposed work.  
 
Table 2: Energy consumption for major processes 
Process Delay(s) Energy 
Secure Bootup (1st stage only) 0.059 4.24mJ 
Encryption (C++) 0.05 22.5µJ/bit 
Sha2 (asm) 0.05 3.6mJ 
Switching (asm+ C) 0.23 16.56mJ 
Fast tate pairing 4.05s 0.292J 
 
 
Table 3: Communication overhead of our trusted authentication scheme 
based on CC2420 transceiver 
Proposed Work Process 
Bytes 
(data + 
header) 
Energy 
Trusted 
Authentication 
Transmit 
(1.83µJ/byte) 319 0.58mJ 
Receive 
(1.98 µJ/byte) 480 0.95mJ 
Key exchange 
Transmit 
(1.83µJ/byte) 85 0.15mJ 
Receive 
(1.98 µJ/byte) 0 0 
 
Total energy used for a one time trusted authentication 
process calculated using equation (8) is 0.027J. Energy 
incurs during Fast tate pairing is not included as its can be 
done offline. Assuming nodes with limited 1000J full 
battery capacity [17], the percentage of  energy used for 
the above processes is to be less than 1%. It is believed 
that the results obtained are an acceptable cost for one-time 
or rare distribution of trust management values to establish 
trust relationship between sensor nodes and the BS.  
6.2 Efficiency 
 
To confirm the efficiency of the proposed scheme, the 
comparison of energy utilization for user authentication 
scheme is tabulated in Table 4. Data for existing work in 
the table were adopted from Rehana’s et. al [18] work. It is 
clearly seen that the proposed mechanism consumes the 
least energy as compared to other schemes for the same 
security features of user authentication and secure 
communications.  
 
Table 4: Energy comparison of proposed user authentication scheme with 
proposed scheme 
Schemes Authentication scheme 
Energ
y 
Costs 
(mJ) 
Storage 
Overhead 
(bytes) 
Session 
Key 
RRUAN ECDSA 106.84 0 No 
DP2AC RSA 14.05 + TE 10N No 
Rehana[18] IBS 72.90 0 Yes 
Proposed 
Scheme 
IBE-
trust+one-way 
AKE 
26.9 2N Yes 
      ** N = number of nodes  
6.3 Security Analysis 
This section generally demonstrates how the proposed 
protocol can prevent typical attacks on sensor networks.  
6.3.1 Physical Attacks 
The use of ARM1176JZF-S as the processor with its On-
Soc memory has helped in this study to protect important 
credentials such as sensor node private keys. Moreover, in 
this scheme, only part of the private key is stored in the 
sensor node memory thus further protect the sensor nodes 
and network. Images such as encryption and decryption are 
stored in the secured memory region of flash memory and 
are only accessible in the secured mode environment. The 
effect of BSL attacks can also be reduced through the 
secure boot process where the integrity of loaded images 
has been verified to prevent sensor nodes from running 
malicious code.  
6.3.2 Node impersonation 
Node impersonation happens when intruders manage to 
duplicate the unique identity of the sensor node that is 
being used during authentication. Non-regeneration of the 
same trust value through secure boot process has 
significantly reduced the possibility of having a 
masquerade node in the network.  
6.3.3 Typical wireless attacks 
 
This study also confirms that the communication during 
trusted authentication is free from active attack such as 
message modification, replay attack, false message through 
packet encryption, nonce value as well as entity and data 
authentication. The confirmation is done through formal 
analysis method and is discuss in another paper.  
  
6.3.4 Security of the proposed scheme 
 
The security of IBE-Trust protocol is best realized through 
the security of full BF IBE scheme. In this scheme, the 
public key can be written as QID = tP for some unknown t. 
Therefore ê(rQID,sP) = ê(rtP,sP) = ê(P,P)rst and ciphertext 
C = (rP,M ⊕H2ê(P,P)rst). If an adversary manages to get 
P and sP from the public parameters, they can calculate 
QID = tP from receiver’s identity and observes rP in the 
ciphertext. Moreover, if the adversary manages to calculate 
ê(P,P)rst from P,sP,rP and tP then it will be able to recover 
the message M by calculating (M ⊕ H2ê(P,P)rst 
⊕ H2(ê(P,P)rst)) = M. Calculating ê(P,P)rst is actually 
solving Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP) and is 
very difficult [10]. This brief analysis confirms the 
confidentiality of unique trust value of each sensor node in 
the network that is sent to BS encrypted with IBE scheme. 
For node to node authentication, our proposed scheme uses 
the ID-based one-pass AKE. In the existing protocol 
presented by [15], the authentication is established when 
both parties manage to generate similar shared key locally. 
In our proposed protocol, beneficiary node will first check 
the identity of nodes requesting to authenticate and 
proceed to compute the secret shared key if the ID exists in 
the table provided by BS. This somehow has provided a 
two tier security mechanism and has limited this expensive 
operation to valid nodes only. Identity-based one-pass 
AKE is based on symmetric bilinear pairings and is secure 
by assuming the hardness of BDHP with H1,H2 and κ 
modeled as random oracle. Interested readers can find 
proof to this method in [15]. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has presented an alternative method to confirm 
the trustworthiness of nodes in WSN. The proposed 
scheme involves designing a trusted platform and an 
energy efficient authentication protocol. For the trusted 
platform, ARM1176JZF-S processor together with 
CC2420 chip has been chosen as the platform processor 
and transceiver respectively. Both processor and 
transceiver chips have greatly supported the design of low 
energy trusted platform. Besides low energy, most 
importantly the proposed trusted platform fulfills the trust 
requirement as outlined in the TCG documentation. 
Consequently, the proposed trusted mechanism has 
contributes to enhance security in WSNs by reducing the 
probability of fake or clone sensor node through non-
regenerated unique platform identity. Finally, the proposed 
work has opened a new research area towards trusted 
sensor node platform. 
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